[codex] batcher consensus proof of concept#20844
Conversation
Wiz Scan Summary
To detect these findings earlier in the dev lifecycle, try using Wiz Code VS Code Extension. |
![wiz-0f98cca50a[bot]](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/58791460?s=60&v=4){kind=small}
| }) | ||
| listener, err := net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:0") | ||
| t.Require().NoError(err) | ||
| server := &http.Server{Handler: mux} |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Uncontrolled Resource Consumption in Go HTTP Server (CWE-400)
More Details
The Go net/http package's default serve functions (http.ListenAndServe, http.ListenAndServeTLS, http.Serve, and http.ServeTLS) do not have configurable timeouts, making them vulnerable to resource consumption attacks like Slowloris. In a Slowloris attack, an adversary opens many connections to the server but sends data very slowly, eventually overwhelming the server's resources and preventing it from accepting new connections.
Failing to set appropriate timeouts on the HTTP server can lead to resource exhaustion, causing a denial of service. This could disrupt the application's availability and potentially enable further attacks if the server crashes or becomes unstable. To mitigate this risk, timeouts should be configured on the http.Server before starting the server.
| Attribute | Value |
|---|---|
| Impact |  |
| Likelihood | |
Remediation
The Go net/http package's default serve functions (http.ListenAndServe, http.ListenAndServeTLS, http.Serve, and http.ServeTLS) do not have configurable timeouts, making them vulnerable to resource consumption attacks like Slowloris. In a Slowloris attack, an adversary opens many connections to the server but sends data very slowly, eventually overwhelming the server's resources and preventing it from accepting new connections. This can lead to a denial of service, disrupting the application's availability and potentially enabling further attacks if the server crashes or becomes unstable.
To mitigate this risk, you should configure appropriate timeouts on the http.Server before starting the server. This can be done by creating a new http.Server instance with the desired timeout values and using its ListenAndServe or ListenAndServeTLS methods instead of the package-level functions.
Code examples
// VULNERABLE CODE - Default serve functions without timeouts
http.ListenAndServe(":8080", nil)// SECURE CODE - Configure timeouts on http.Server
server := &http.Server{
Addr: ":8080",
ReadHeaderTimeout: 5 * time.Second, // Timeout for reading the entire request header
ReadTimeout: 10 * time.Second, // Timeout for reading the entire request body
WriteTimeout: 10 * time.Second, // Timeout for writing the response
IdleTimeout: 120 * time.Second, // Timeout for idle connections
}
log.Fatal(server.ListenAndServe())Additional recommendations
- Follow the principle of least privilege and set timeouts as low as reasonably possible for your application's needs.
- Consider using a reverse proxy or load balancer with timeout configurations to add an additional layer of protection.
- Implement monitoring and alerting for slow or hanging requests to detect potential attacks early.
- Refer to the OWASP Denial of Service guidance and CWE-400 for best practices in mitigating resource consumption vulnerabilities.
- Regularly review and update timeout configurations as your application's requirements change.
Rule ID: WS-I011-GO-00018
To ignore this finding as an exception, reply to this conversation with #wiz_ignore reason
If you'd like to ignore this finding in all future scans, add an exception in the .wiz file (learn more) or create an Ignore Rule (learn more).
To get more details on how to remediate this issue using AI, reply to this conversation with #wiz remediate
| "CommonwareSimplexBatchConsensusVerifier.sol", | ||
| "CommonwareSimplexBatchConsensusVerifier.json", | ||
| ) | ||
| data, err := os.ReadFile(artifactPath) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Improper Path Validation in File Operations (CWE-22)
More Details
This vulnerability arises when an application fails to properly validate file paths or filenames before performing operations on them. If user input is used to construct file paths or filenames without proper sanitization, an attacker could exploit this vulnerability to access unauthorized files or directories on the system.
The consequences of this vulnerability can be severe, as it may allow an attacker to read sensitive data, overwrite critical system files, or even gain elevated privileges on the system. Path traversal attacks, where an attacker attempts to access files outside the intended directory, are a common exploitation technique for this vulnerability.
To mitigate this risk, it is crucial to validate and sanitize all user input used in file operations. This includes properly handling directory separators, removing any path traversal sequences, and restricting access to only the intended directories. Additionally, it is recommended to use a whitelist approach, where only a predefined set of safe paths or filenames are allowed.
| Attribute | Value |
|---|---|
| Impact | |
| Likelihood | |
Remediation
This vulnerability arises when an application fails to properly validate and sanitize user-supplied file paths or filenames before performing file operations. If an attacker can control the file path or filename, they may be able to access unauthorized files or directories on the system, potentially leading to data breaches, system compromise, or privilege escalation.
To mitigate this vulnerability, it is crucial to validate and sanitize all user input used in file operations. This includes properly handling directory separators, removing any path traversal sequences, and restricting access to only the intended directories. It is recommended to use a whitelist approach, where only a predefined set of safe paths or filenames are allowed.
Code examples
// VULNERABLE CODE - User input is used directly in file operations without validation
func handleRequest(r *http.Request) {
filename := r.URL.Query().Get("file")
data, err := os.ReadFile(filename)
// ...
}// SECURE CODE - User input is validated and sanitized before file operations
import (
"path/filepath"
"strings"
)
func handleRequest(r *http.Request) {
filename := r.URL.Query().Get("file")
cleanPath := filepath.Clean(filename)
if !strings.HasPrefix(cleanPath, "/safe/directory/") {
// Reject the request if the path is not within the allowed directory
http.Error(w, "Invalid file path", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
data, err := os.ReadFile(cleanPath)
// ...
}Additional recommendations
- Use a whitelist approach to restrict file operations to a predefined set of safe paths or filenames.
- Implement strict input validation and sanitization for all user-supplied data used in file operations.
- Follow the principle of least privilege and restrict file access permissions as much as possible.
- Regularly update and patch your software to address known vulnerabilities.
- Adhere to security best practices and standards, such as the OWASP Top 10 and CWE-22 (Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory).
- Consider using secure coding libraries or frameworks that provide built-in protection against path traversal vulnerabilities.
Rule ID: WS-I011-GO-00013
To ignore this finding as an exception, reply to this conversation with #wiz_ignore reason
If you'd like to ignore this finding in all future scans, add an exception in the .wiz file (learn more) or create an Ignore Rule (learn more).
To get more details on how to remediate this issue using AI, reply to this conversation with #wiz remediate
1 participant
Summary
This draft PR adds a blob-mode-only batcher consensus proof of concept.
eth_callto an L1 verifier contract and skips invalid proofsop-up smoke-batcher-consensusCWSIMPLX1 || digest || marker || fixed POC envelope || Commonware certificatecalldata envelope for the Commonware sidecar pathcontracts-bedrockSolidity verifier for the Commonware Simplex certificate, with a raw fallback entrypoint for the op-nodeeth_callpathsha256(union_unique(finalize_namespace, proposal.encode()))eth_callpath has the P256 precompile available--l2-rpc-portfor running valid and invalid demo networks side by sidePOC Caveat
The current sidecar runs a deterministic in-process Commonware Simplex network for the POC. The verifier now directly checks the Commonware secp256r1 certificate signatures in Solidity/EVM against a configured committee and quorum; the remaining POC-specific part is the batch-consensus calldata envelope/certificate layout used by the sidecar path.
Validation
The DevStack acceptance tests show valid Commonware consensus proof calldata advancing
local-safe, and invalid proof calldata being rejected withfalse batch consensus verifier resultwhilelocal-saferemains at genesis.The live OP Up smoke run started a valid proof demo on
http://localhost:8545and an invalid proof demo onhttp://localhost:8546;smoke-batcher-consensus allobserved the valid safe head reach the submitted transfer block and the invalid safe head stay below the submitted transfer block for 20 seconds.Note: the direct Solidity build used
--deny neverbecause a normalforge buildis blocked in this checkout by existing repo lint warnings outside this verifier change. The DevStack and OP Up runs usedDEVSTACK_L2EL_KIND=op-gethin this environment because op-reth was not built locally.